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REALIST LAWYERS
AND REALISTIC LEGALISTS:
A BRIEF REBUTTAL TO JUDGE POSNER
MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE†
As Judge Posner—an avowed realist—notes, debates between
realism and legalism in interpreting judicial behavior are as old as
1
judging. One modern incarnation of the debate involves the validity
and meaning of empirical legal studies, a breed of scholarship that
codes information about judicial decisions and uses statistical analysis
to describe judicial behavior. In our recent article, “Pitfalls of
Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting
2
Appellate Decisionmaking,” Judge Harry T. Edwards and I argue
that this scholarship is often marred for a variety of reasons ranging
from the conceptual to the practical.
With respect to this issue, Judge Posner provides an important
counterpoint. Although debates between realists and legalists are
sometimes heated, Judge Posner recognizes that they are often
overblown because “[m]uch but by no means all of the apparent
disagreement [between us] dissolves if proper weight is given to
3
concessions on both sides.” Although there are vast differences of
emphasis between the legalist and realist schools of thoughts, the
models of judicial behavior are essentially similar.
A “realist legal model,” which combines aspects of both the
realist and legalist schools of thought, recognizes not only that
traditional legal materials are a key determinant of judicial decisions,
but also that law is not deterministic, and that ideology (properly
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understood) is also central to legal decisionmaking. This model,
which better comports with widespread notions of how legal decisions
are actually made, can serve as a more solid foundation for empirical
study of judicial behavior than the law-politics divide that
oversimplifies the complex relationship between legal materials,
values, and normative analysis that is at the heart of legal reasoning.
A. The Fundamental Consensus
In their pure forms, the legalist and realist camps are starkly
4
different. The realists see judges as playing a “legislative role,”
5
deciding cases according to preexisting “attitudes” or preferences.
The legalist approach in its pure form sees judges as legal “machines”
6
simply applying law to facts in a mechanistic process.
Of course, no one (or very few, especially within the legal
community) subscribes to the legalist or realist positions in their pure
form. Although many have argued against legal formalism, very few
7
appear to have strenuously defended this view. Alternatively, even
realists like Judge Posner recognize that law often has an extremely
important role in determining case outcomes.
Once these “concessions” are recognized, what remains are
largely similar views about how judicial decisions are made. This
shared model (perhaps the realist legal model) proposes that
traditional legal materials, including precedent, records on appeal,
and applicable laws and statutes, are central to legal reasoning and,
combined with widely shared notions of how to interpret those
materials, dictate outcomes in a large majority of cases. The realist
legal model also recognizes that law, on its own, is not deterministic,
and that judges’ values, beliefs, and perspectives—ideology broadly
construed—influence judicial outcomes. This influence is not bad in

4.
5.

Id. at 1177.
See generally GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND
IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 1946–1963 (1965) (attempting to demonstrate
through empirical evidence that political and economic liberalism impact judicial
decisionmaking by the Supreme Court).
6. Judge Posner uses the idea of an “oracle” with the “personality of a coaxial cable” to
describe the legalists’ view of judges. Posner, supra note 1, at 1178.
7. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 2, at 1915 (citing Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism
of Judges Past and Present, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 77, 91 (2009)). See generally BRIAN
TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING
(2009) (deconstructing the formalist-realist divide by revealing that formalist-era jurists, as well
as leading contemporary legal formalists, held realistic views of the law).
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the sense that it is opposed to law or extrinsic to legal reasoning.
Rather, it has an important and central place in the American legal
system. Traditional legal materials and ideology, then, are
8
complementary aspects of judicial decisionmaking.
B. Residual Differences
9

Judge Posner identifies two areas of “residual difference.” First,
Judge Posner sees an implicit claim of moral realism in our
recognition that law includes “forms of moral and political
10
reasoning.” Judge Posner rejects moral realism, which he defines
elsewhere as “the doctrine that there are universal moral laws
11
ontologically akin to scientific laws.” He is therefore troubled by
what he sees as a moral-realist foundation to our claim that law
encompasses moral or political reasoning and would instead favor an
approach that acknowledges only that moral and political beliefs play
a role in the law. Second, Judge Posner disagrees about the role of
judicial deliberations in shaping outcomes.
As to the first objection, moral realism is not a prerequisite to
our argument. We simply note that judges are sometimes “obliged to
rely—and to do so self-consciously and overtly—on political and
12
ideological values in their legal reasoning.” We then argue that
“[t]his cannot seriously be doubted, nor can it reasonably be seen as
surprising,” that this practice is included in the meaning of “legal
13
reasoning,” and that it is “merely part of the judicial function.”
Reasoning, in the sense that we use it, merely implies that the
“political and ideological values” that judges rely on in their decisions
are based not merely on “personal whim or preference” but instead
are based on “a situated and disciplined elaboration of the
14
conventional norms of the American political community.” This
“elaboration” can take the form of reflection or discourse with other
judges, but it does not rely on the existence of objective moral facts,
8. Ideology and traditional legal materials, then, are complements—working together to
produce judicial outcomes—rather than substitutes. This relationship has important implications
for designing and interpreting the results of empirical analysis.
9. Posner, supra note 1, at 1186.
10. Id. at 1183 (quoting Edwards & Livermore, supra note 2, at 1900).
11. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY, at ix
(1999) (adopting “pragmatic moral skepticism” over moral realism).
12. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 2, at 1947 (emphasis omitted).
13. Id. at 1947–48.
14. Id. at 1946.
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nor does it preclude the influence of “professional training and
experiences, political ideology, temperament, [and] personal-identity
15
characteristics such as race and sex.” In some cases, the law requires
recourse to moral beliefs, regardless of whether there are objective
moral truths. Irrespective of the truth of moral realism, decisions
based on moral beliefs cannot categorically be classified as ideological
in a manner opposed or extrinsic to law. The realist legal model, then,
does not rely on any claims about the truth of moral realism.
The other “residual difference” concerns the role of deliberation
in judicial decisionmaking. Here there is no doubt a legitimate
disagreement about an important aspect of judicial behavior. Judge
Edwards has argued that there is a strong role for deliberation in
16
shaping judicial outcomes. Judge Posner is skeptical, and has written
about the potential role of “dissent aversion” rather than deliberation
17
in accounting for unanimous decisions. Neither of these positions is
18
more realist or legalist than the other —they are simply competing
empirical hypotheses that both fit within the same basic model.
Remaining differences tend to be matters of emphasis. Neither
side denies the importance of unpublished decisions in the work of
federal courts or the importance of novel legal questions to shaping
the law, although one camp might focus efforts on one aspect over the
other. But emphasis on particular legal products does not implicate
the underlying model of judicial decisionmaking.
Although the realist legal model finds support among both
partisans of the legalist and realist camps, it is not typically used as
the basis for empirical legal studies. As a consequence, those studies
offer less insight into how judicial decisions are made. By basing their
15. Posner, supra note 1, at 1178.
16. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1645–52 (2003).
17. Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges
Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis 1–2 (Nov. 13, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the Duke Law Journal).
18. Both positions are consistent with widely observed “panel effects.” See Richard L.
Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical Examination of Challenges
to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1112 (2001) (noting that panel
effects can be explained by either a “deliberation hypothesis” or a “dissent hypothesis”).
Attempts have been made to distinguish between strategic and deliberative influences, see, e.g.,
Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical
Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319 (2009), but significant difficulties remain,
see Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Response, Psychology, Strategy, and Behavior
Equivalence, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 75, 77–81 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/
responses/11-2009/LindquistMartinek.pdf.
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work on a richer model of judicial decisionmaking, empirical legal
scholars can increase the explanatory power of their work and its
usefulness in understanding judicial behavior.
C. Reforming Empirical Legal Scholarship
Professor Cross succinctly captures the central premise of the
most influential thread of empirical legal studies: “Judicial politics or
ideology is commonly juxtaposed with decision making according to
law. . . . Whether the judge is deciding [cases] according to the better
legal arguments or to his or her ideology is the question. Quantitative
19
empirical research is suited to help answer this question.”
The realist legal model renders the question unintelligible. If
what constitutes “the better legal argument” relies, in part, on
reference to values; moral and political beliefs; and other components
of ideology, then there is no conflict between the two—a decision
need not be made according to law or ideology if one encompasses
the other. Although some types of ideological considerations should
not be considered legal arguments, it is not clear that empirical legal
research, as it has traditionally been practiced, is “suited to help
answer” whether and when those types of extralegal ideological
considerations affect outcomes.
Put another way, ideology, broadly construed, is a necessary
component of judging. Democratic values; notions of appropriate
tools of interpretation; concerns about consistency, rule of law, and
reliance interests; notions of fairness and equity: all of these factors
can be categorized as ideology. In the vast majority of cases, there is
sufficient ideological overlap that its distinct role in judicial
decisionmaking is invisible. Judges and other experienced members
of the legal community share common ideas about what the law
means, and those ideas, along with relevant legal materials and
factual findings, light a clear path toward the resolution of a case. In a
small number of cases, judges have sufficiently different ideas about
the appropriate interpretation of legal texts, or moral and political
values, that they disagree on the appropriate resolution. But these
types of cases are not necessarily more ideological than any other.

19. FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 12, 14 (2007).
This is a strong statement of the goal of these studies; other scholars may offer a more limited
view on the goal of empirical scholarship, focused on teasing out how various personal factors
(for example, judges’ age, gender, or prior background) impact outcomes.
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Many studies have used judicial appointment variables, such as
the party of the president who appointed a judge, as a crude proxy for
judicial ideology. Under the realist legal model, this proxy mixes
“bad” extralegal ideology with the regular “good” ideology necessary
for legal reasoning, and is therefore not only crude but also
confounding. Studies that use this proxy find both too much and too
little ideology, and the correlations between these variables and
outcomes say nothing about the role of law or ideology in
determining case outcomes. Although appointment variables are not
very instructive about judicial behavior, they may be better suited to
studies about the appointments process and its effects.
If empirical legal scholars wish to study whether extralegal
ideological considerations affect judicial decisions, they must first
develop an appropriate normative account of what constitute
extralegal considerations, and then develop a methodology for
separating out those types of factors from standard, run-of-the-mill
judicial decisionmaking. Identifying these extralegal factors and
testing for their influence is a potential project for the field.
More important for understanding judicial behavior, the realist
legal model can help refocus empirical legal studies on the legal
20
materials at the heart of legal reasoning. Some initial attempts have
21
been made to study the effect of precedent. The task of coding legal
materials is not easy, but creative solutions or sheer muscle could
overcome some of the problems, and systematic evaluation of the
effect of precedent, records on appeal, or legal materials prepared by
parties, could prove extraordinarily illuminating. More sophisticated
analysis of the outputs—judicial decisions—could also prove
22
extremely useful, and law professors may be well suited to the task.
Connecting more fully rendered data on opinions to information on
precedent, for example, could help generate analysis on the viability
of certain legal authorities in particular areas of law.
Given the state of empirical legal studies, this kind of
sophisticated analysis is a long way off. Large-scale problems of
coding, computation, analysis, and interpretation must first be

20. Other scholars sympathetic to the project of empirical legal scholarship have suggested
that greater emphasis on the law would help improve research in this area. See, e.g., Barry
Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 261, 262 (2006).
21. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 2, at 1928–29.
22. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial
Opinions, 96 CAL. L. REV. 63, 64 (2008).
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overcome. Appropriate questions would require formulation,
statistical models would require development, and methods for
generating and processing data would have to be invented. None of
this will be easy, but abandoning the past emphasis on the illusory
law-politics divide and founding the field on a more realistic model of
judicial behavior would be a good start.

